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Effect of Agency Problems on RTC Hotel Appraisals
Abstract
Agency problems that helped cause the banking crisis in the United States in the 1980s impacted hotel
appraisals competed for the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC). Lower appraised values would help make
more bids acceptable, helping to sell more assets quickly. The results indicate appraised hotel values were
much lower than sales prices in states with a high number of bank failures.
This article is available in Hospitality Review: http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/hospitalityreview/vol21/iss1/5
Effect of agency problems 
on RTC hotel appraisals 
by Michael C. Dalbor 
Agency problems that helped cause the bankmg industry were so severe 
banking crisis m the United States in the that fie ~ ~ d ~ ~ ~ l  savings and L~~ 1980s impacted hotel appraaals completed 
forlhe Resolut,on Just Co~poration (RJC). Insurance CO~Ora t iOn  (FS1,TC) 
Lower appra~sed values wwld help make went bankrupt and the Federal 
mwe bids acceptable, helping to sell more I~~~~~~~~ corporation 
assets quickly. The results indicafe 
appraised hotel values were much lower losses in the 
than sales ~ t h z s  in states wrth a hiah late 1980s. 
number of bank failures. 
gency problems such as 
moral hazard and regulatory 
forbearance contributed to 
the banking crises in the United 
States in the late 1980s and early 
1990s. Moral hazard can generally 
be defined as agents taking actions 
to the detnment of thcir employers. 
In terms of the banking industry, 
this cccumed as bank officials took 
actions that were not in the best 
interest of depositors. Regulatory 
forbearance was the practice of 
government regulators foregoing 
disciplinary actions against trou- 
bled banks in the hope that the 
banks would turn themselves 
around. The problems with the 
Some of the major causes of the 
crises were practices used by many 
lenders at the time. In order for 
borrowers to quality for a loan, an 
appraisal had to be completed. This 
led to a number of problems in the 
loan process. For one, commercial 
properties are often more special- 
ized and complex than single-family 
residences, requiring more special- 
ized skills and training. However, at 
the time, appraisers were desig- 
nated by a wide variety of organiza- 
tions that were not organized under 
the auspices of state governments. 
Therefore, the educational back- 
ground and experience of these 
appraisers varied significantly. 
Another major factor in the 
pmcess was the ability of borrowers 
to hire appraisers directly. This 
- 
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meant that the appraiser was 
working directly for the borrowers, 
who were primarily interested in 
seeing values that would justify the 
loans for their projects. While an 
appraiser's compensation was not 
based upon any particular value, 
appraisers were not compensated 
based upon accuracy either. 
Appraisers were (and still are) 
compensated at a flat rate. 
However, appraisers who presented 
values that were consistently too 
low for borrowers to qualify for loans 
were putting any future potential 
business in jeopardy. 
RTC solves problems 
This situation got out ofhand by 
the late 1980s. An extreme example 
was the case of a parcel of vacant 
commercial land that was appraised 
a total of six times. The appraised 
values began at $2 million and even- 
tually rose to $175 million on the 
same parcel. FSLIC later sold the 
property at auction for $2.5 million.' 
Congress linally began to deal with 
the problem of cleaning up the 
banking mess though the Financial 
Institutions Reform, Recovery and 
Enforcement Act (FIRREA) of 1989. 
President Bush signed the bill that 
included a wide variety of refonns 
regarding the appraisal industry. A 
major provision of the act was the 
formation of the Resolution Tn~st  
Corporation (RTC), which was 
given the daunting task of selling a 
significant number of problem real 
and financial assets of failed banks 
in a timely manner. 
The RTC was formed to help 
solve a problem with which many 
politicians in Congress did not 
particularly want to deal. First, 
Congress passed legislation in 1980 
that served to deregulate the 
savings and loans industry in order 
to help keep it competitive. Further- 
more, this legislation increased 
deposit insurance to $100,000 per 
account, which created a large 
moral hazard problem by allowing 
savings and loans to use greater 
amounts of brokered deposits. 
By the time the RTC was 
formed, the problem was enormous, 
particularly in the southwestern 
United States. The FDIC tracked 
bank failures in the U.S. between 
1980 and 1994. During this time, 
599 banks, or more than 29 percent 
of total supply, failed in Texas alone. 
Failures in other states were also 
high: 44 percent of banks in Alaska 
failed along with 33 percent of 
banks in Oklahoma. The total for 
the U.S. and Puerto Rico was 1,614, 
or 9.1 percent of total supply, 
dwarfing the banking problems of 
the Great Depression.' 
For years before the formation 
of the RTC, the costs of the cleanup 
were consistently underestimated. 
The problem was a large and 
growing one that needed to be taken 
care of in a timely manner in order 
to ensure the solvency of the 
banking system and have the 
smallest impact on the economy. 
The nature of the problem was 
rather embarrassing for politicians, 
who were seen as part of the 
problem to begin with. Additionally, 
many in Congress did not want to 
raise taxes during a period of wors- 
ening economic conditions. There- 
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fore, the RTC was only intended to 
be a temporary government agency 
that would sell non-performing 
assets and loans to various bidders. 
Moreover, the government intended 
to monitor the operations of the 
RTC via the Government 
Accounting Ofice (GAO) which 
would make reports to Congress. 
Asset sale is goal 
Given the political sensitivity of 
the savings and loan cleanup and 
the limited funding of the RTC, one 
of the major goals of the RTC was 
the cumulative sale of a s sek3  
These sales and the ratio of sales 
price to appraised value were 
reported to Congress by the GAO. 
Although the RTC was also evalu- 
ated on the ratio of sales proceeds to 
book value, the sales goal was 
significant. For example, the RTC's 
sales goal in 1992 alone was 
approximately $100 billion? This 
goal had an important effect on the 
operations of RTC officials. 
Examples of the problems 
created by the book value reduction 
goal were revealed in a GAO report 
on RTC auctions held in the Wash- 
ingtonBaltimore area in 1992. The 
GAO concluded that the auctions 
were not planned or managed 
correctly in order to maximize 
revenuesi Complete information 
was not always supplied to bidders 
and many times property infonna- 
tion was inaccurate. It appears that 
the R E  was overwhelmed and 
unprepared for the task given to 
them. As the GAO concluded, "inad- 
equacies occurred.. .because the 
staffwas motivated to get sales done 
quickly in order to meet the book 
value reduction goals.'" 
One of the major tools used by 
RTC oificials in the auction process 
was a recent appraisal of the prop- 
erty. Since the RTC was generally 
not experienced in real estate 
management or valuation, it relied 
significantly upon experienced 
appraisers to help assist in selecting 
a winning bid on an asset. While 
recovery rates on book value were 
tracked and evaluated, removing 
properties from the books was a 
major priority. Therefore, if a hotel 
was appraised at a relatively high 
value, it would be possible that no 
bids could be accepted because they 
were too far below the appraised 
value. On the other hand, low 
appraised values would mean that 
the bids would be closer to the 
appraisals, perhaps even exceeding 
them. This would make more bids 
acceptable, helping to sell the assets 
faster. Moreover, it might make the 
RTC appear to be more "efficient" by 
accepting bids above appraised 
values. 
Policies are established 
At the end of 1992, the RTC 
issued a directive stating all of its 
auctions must be conducted in 
accordance with established policies 
and guidelines. By establishing poli- 
cies and procedures and by gainmg 
experience over time, the situation 
at the RTC began to improve. By 
1993, the end was in sight for the 
RTC because there were fewer prop- 
erties to sell. In May 1993 Congress 
passed the Resolution Trust Corpo- 
ration Completion Act. This act 
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served to phase out the RTC begin- 
ning with a transition period in 
April 1994. The RTC had worked 
fast enough to allow Congress to 
move up the complete termination 
of the RTC from December 31, 
1996, to December 31,1995. Given 
the foregoing occurrences in 1993, 
there was clearly less political 
pressure to achieve book value 
reduction goals than in 1991 or 
1992. RTC commercial real estate 
sales (not just hotels) totaled 7,031 
between 1989 and 1993, with 
5,814 occurring before 1993.7 
Monitoring is ineffective 
One of the major agency prob- 
lems in the savings and loan crisis 
was ineffective monitoring. This 
was embodied in the policy engaged 
in by federal regulators known as  
regulatory forbearance. This is a 
policy where insolvent banking 
institutions were permitted to 
continue operating in the hope that 
conditions would improve enough 
for them to recover. Additionally, 
regulators feared that closing these 
institutions would have too much of 
a negative impact on the solvency of 
the deposit insurance fund. 
Research indicates that between 
1980 and 1988, insolvent institu- 
tions remained open for an average 
of approximately 17 months after 
being declared insolvent. In one 
case, a bank that was declared insol- 
vent in 1979 was still operating in 
1988.' 
The policy of regulatory forbear- 
ance only served to delay dealing 
with the problem. The delay helped 
increase the magnitude of the 
problem the RTC had to deal with 
later. The increasing number of 
insolvent institutions served to 
deplete the deposit insurance more 
rapidly and increased the need to 
speed up the disposal of assets at  
insolvent institutions. % in turn 
led to the bookvalue reduction goals 
previously discussed and the need 
for appraisals that could help 
accomplish that goal. 
Given the evidence that 
"aggressive" appraisals contributed 
to the banking crisis of the 1980s, 
the literature on appraisal accuracy 
is surprisingly limited. Moreover, 
only a modest amount of research 
has focused on specific types of 
commercial real estate such as 
hotels. However, the appraisal accu- 
racy literature generally supports 
the notion that appraised values are 
affected by the agency relationships 
in the process and the motivations 
of the parties involved. 
Appraisal "accuracy" is gener- 
ally measured as the difference 
between the sales price and the 
appraised value expressed as a 
percentage of the sales price. 
Accordingly, a negative difference 
indicates the appraised value is 
lower than the sales price. The 
earliest research examined mean 
absolute differences with only three 
hotels in the sample." However, the 
authors of this research recognized 
that the sign of the difference is of 
particular importance to real estate 
investors and updated their find- 
ings. The research disclosed a wide 
variety of differences across prop- 
erty types such as sales prices 
exceeding appraised values by 
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nearly 24 percent for apartments 
and appraised values exceeding 
sales prices for hotels by more than 
5 percent.'O This indicated that 
these differences could vary across 
property types, region, and, 
perhaps, different years. 
The first study that looked at 
signed differcnces over time 
revealed changes in percentage 
amounts across property types as 
well as during different phases of 
the real estate cycle. Sincc many of 
the differences were statistically 
different from zero, it is believed 
that certain properties were easier 
for appraisers to value than others." 
Other real estate researchers 
argued that agency relationships in 
the appraisal process play a more 
important role than specific prop- 
erty characteristics or flaws in 
appraisal methodology." 
Research was subsequently 
completed involving hotels that 
examined the agency relationships 
involved in the process along with 
economic circumstances and 
hypothesized motivations of the 
parties involved. Using differences 
between sales prices and appraised 
values, the findings revealed 
changes in signs and percentages 
across time. Additionally, the 
research found that the time period 
when the appraisal was completed 
and the identity of the appraisal 
client (either the RTC or institu- 
tional lenders such as banks) had 
significant effects on the  result^.'^ 
Existing literaturc has revealed 
that differences between appraised 
values and sales prices ofhotels will 
change over time. The literature has 
also lent support to the notion that 
the agency relationships and the 
motivations of the parties in the 
appraisal process can have an 
impact on appraised values. Accord- 
ingly, this research will examine the 
values of hotels appraised for the 
RTC to see if the results were 
impacted by the goals and motiva- 
tions of the RTC. 
FDIC supplied data 
The data for this study were 
supplied by the FDIC. The data 
included hotel appraised values and 
sales prices from RTC auctions held 
between 1989 and 1994. The vari- 
able of interest is the percentage 
difference between the appraised 
value and the sales price which is 
calculated as (appraised value - 
sales pricej/sales price. Therefore, 
positive differences represent, 
appraised values exceeding sales 
prices while negative differences 
refer to sales prices exceeding 
appraised values. Sales prices were 
adjusted to the date of appraisal 
using the Col-nell Index, a hedonic 
index based upon changes in key 
factors aifecting hotel sales prices." 
Statistics compiled by the FDIC 
indicate a total of 1,617 FDIC- 
insured bank failures in the United 
States between 1980 and 1994, or 
9.1 percent of total. High bank 
failure states are considered to be 
those in the upper quartile in terms 
of percentage of banks that failed, 
meaning a failure rate of approxi- 
mately 12.5 percent and above. The 
states in this upper quartile 
included Alaska, Arizona, Cali- 
fornia, Connecticut, District of 
Dalbor 
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Columbia, Louisiana, New Hamp- 
shire, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, 
and Wyoming. Hotels with sales 
prices below $1 million were 
excluded to avoid inclusion of time 
share properties and partial interest. 
The differences were subsequently 
examined for n o d t y  One outlier 
was removed, leaving a total sample 
of 124 hotel appraisals, including 40 
from high bank failure states. A 
breakdown of the samples by year is 
shown in Table 1. 
Given the need for the RTC to 
dispose of non-performing assets 
quickly, particularly in states with a 
high number of bank failures, this 
study hypothesizes that appraisals 
in these states were lower than 
appraised values. As discussed 
earlier, lower appraised values 
would make bids more readily 
acceptable, meaning quicker sales 
and helping the RTC meet its asset 
reduction goals. The expectation is 
that the mean differences for hotel 
appraisals in the high bank failure 
states are going to be significantly 
less than in other states. 
As previously discussed, legisla- 
tion was enacted in 1993 that 
dictated the eventual takeover of 
the RTC by the FDIC and the 
demise of the RTC altogether. By 
this time, a significant number of 
assets had been sold. Furthermore, 
economic conditions in the hotel 
industry were much improved as 
compared to 1991, one of the worst 
years for the U.S. lodging industry 
since the 1970s. With less pressure 
to sell properties quickly, this may 
not have forced appraised values 
lower as in the early years of RTC 
operations. Therefore, the expecta- 
tion is that mean difference for hotel 
appraisals completed in 1993 will be 
higher than those before 1993. 
The next step in the analysis is 
to examine the explanatory power 
of these factors in a regression 
model, which will utilize variables 
related to the factors previously 
discussed, appraisals completed in 
Table 1 
RTC hotel appraisals by year 
Year Total sample Hotels in high Hotels in other 
bank failure states 
1989 3 1 2 
1990 15 7 8 
1991 38 12 26 
1992 44 14 30  
Note: The laDle s h o ~ s  lhe norel appra!sals dseo in lnc analys,s The brsr column rrsls the year, the 
secondcolumn deranrs lhe number 0lapp.w sa,s m me ent~re sanlple: me ln,rdcolumn 11srs the number 
01 appm~sals comprcled n lhc hngn Dank lalllrre slales 
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high bank failure states, and 
appraisals completed in 1993 or 
later. Additionally, a combination 
variable will be added to the model 
that represents those properties 
appraised in high bank failure 
states and in 1993 or later. This 
last variable is created by multi- 
plying the high bank failure vari- 
able by the 1993 variable. This 
variable will also be tested for 
significance as there still may have 
been strong incentive to sell prop- 
erties quickly in the high bank 
failure states even after 1993. 
Therefore, the full regression 
model is as follows: % Diff = 
Regression Intercept + High 
Failure + 1993 + (High Failure and 
1993) + Error Term. Variations of 
this model will be examined to 
assess which model is the best. 
Results show differences 
Differences between appraised 
values and sales prices for hotels in 
high bank failure states were 
compared to other observations in 
the sample using a t-test. Addition- 
any, differences between appraised 
values and sales prices for hotels 
appraised in 1993 or later were also 
compared to other observations 
using the same test. The results are 
shown in Table 2. 
T-test results lend support to 
the hypotheses. The mean differ- 
ence in the high bank failure states 
was negative and significantly 
lower than the mean difference for 
appraisals completed in other 
states. Additionally, themean differ- 
ence for appraisals completed in 
1993 or later was positive and 
significantly higher than the mean 
difference for appraisals completed 
in a prior period. Although the 
difference between appraised 
values and sales prices for all prop- 
erties before 1993 was negative, the 
difference is very small (only -.7 
percent) and not significantly 
different from zero. 
Table 2 
Two sample t-tests 
Mean difference ol Mean difference of T-test lor 
Factor 01 interest appraisals related olher appraisals signilicant 
lo factor of interest in sample differences 
Hntels in hioh bank failure states -8.3"/0 9.0% 3.85'-' 
Hotels appraised in 1993 o r  later 18.9% -.7% -2.41" 
Nole: Tne 1aDe dela!h lne r ~ s u  1s 01 1-IGSIS cor?dr~l+o 011 172 s3mp.e m e  f r s r  co.,mrr . ss  me laclor 
01 .nlcreir me srconc mlumn pro, ocs me mean perccrlaqe d8HcrencG ozhveen 8ppralseo ,due 
and sales price for those appraisals described ,n the f i ~ l  column. The lhird column represents lhc 
mean percenlage differences for other appraisals n the sample. The fourih column b ls  the T-statistic 
from the lest for significanl differences between the second and lhird mlumns. 
.'Significanl at the .05 level. 
"'Significant a1 the .01 level, 
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The results of the five different 
regression models are shown in 
Table 3. All of the variables were 
significant at  a .05 level of signifi- 
cance or greater. The simple regres- 
sion models with one independent 
variable are significant, but have 
only limited explanatory power. 
However, the coefficient of the high 
bank failure variable has a negative 
sign as expected. This means that 
appraised values of hotels in high 
bank failure states were less than 
sales prices. Conversely, the coeffi- 
cient of the 1993 variable has a posi- 
tive sign, also as expected. 
The best model includes all 
three variables, including the inter- 
action between high bank failure 
and 1993. The coefficient of this 
variable is significant and negative, 
meaning that appraised values 
were less than sales prices for those 
hotels located in hlgh bank failure 
states and appraised in 1993 or 
later. This lends support to the 
notion that the cleanup problem 
was particularly severe in high 
bank failure states and that the 
RTC may have continued to influ- 
ence appraised values downward in 
those states even in 1993 and later. 
The study hypothesized that the 
agency problems of moral hazard 
and regulatory forbearance that 
contributed to the banking crisis 
also had an impact on RTC opera- 
tions. These problems may have led 
RTC officials to influence hotel 
appraised values downward in 
states with a high number of bank 
failures to make more bids accept- 
able and "get the assets off the 
books" quickly. The results tend to 
support this notion, with hotel 
appraised values being significantly 
less than market values in high 
bank failure states, even after the 
1993 legislation that established 
guidelines and proposed the 
Table 3 
Regression results 
Regression Intercept High failure 1993 High failure F' Adjusted 
model and 1993 R2 
(1) 9.03"' -17.36"' 12.47"' 8.5% 
121 -67 19.54"' 11.94"' 8.2% 
(5) 3.03 -10.64" 25.21"' -29.96" 10.26"' 18.4% 
Note: The table details ihe results olt-tests conducled on the samole. The first column lists the factor 
of interest. The second column orovides the mean Dercentaoe d;~erence between aooraisnd vallx . ~ ~~~ -~ ~ ~ ~~ ~~ -~ ~ - - ~ - . -  -.. 
and sales pnce lor those appralsals uescnbea m the hrsr column. The thlra corumn represents tne 
mean percentage arnerences lor ofher appraisals m fnc sanlple. The fourth column rsrs are T.slabst,c 
from the test for significant c3Herences between the second and miid columns 
"Significant af the .05 level. 
"'Signilicant at the .O1 level. 
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takeover of RTC operations by the 
FDIC. 
Further research could be 
completed regarding the interaction 
between agency problems such as 
moral hazard and r e g u l a t o ~  
forbearance and economic circum- 
stances regarding their impact on 
appraised values of other types of 
real estate. Further investigation 
could also be conducted on how the 
lack of readily available information 
affects the hotel appraisal process. 
Overall, it appears that further 
research into agency relationships 
in the process may bring forth some 
interesting insights with respect to 
appraisal accuracy. 
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